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I. INTRODUCTION
South Carolina recently promulgated new guidelines regulating the
State’s consideration of requests by private marsh island owners to build
bridges for vehicular access through publicly owned marsh and tidelands.1
Many thousands of these islands hug the South Carolina coast, but they are
surrounded by tidelands subject to South Carolina’s formidable public trust
doctrine, which obligates the State to manage submerged lands and
waterways for the benefit of the public.2 This piece evaluates the
relationship between the public trust doctrine and the takings subtext3 to the
debate over the new guidelines – a relationship that has become particularly
interesting in the aftermath of a key Supreme Court takings decision,
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,4 in which the public trust doctrine made a latebreaking appearance on remand.
1
S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N) (2006) (replacing the existing regulation declared invalid
by the South Carolina Supreme Court for vagueness). The regulations were promulgated by
the Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (OCRM). See Office of Ocean and
Coastal Res. Mgmt., Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, available at
http://www.scdhec.net/environment/ocrm (last visited Feb. 4, 2007).
2
See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). Traditionally, the common law doctrine has
focused on protecting fishing and navigational values, although more modern articulations of
the doctrine have also rendered protection for ecological, recreational, and scenic values
associated with submerged lands. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine
County, 658 P.2d 709, 712, 728 (Cal. 1983). Because other pieces in this symposium issue
provide such careful treatments of the public trust doctrine, this essay defers to these sources
for a fuller exposition of the doctrine. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Ecosystem
Services and the Public Trust Doctrine: Working Change from Within, 15 SOUTHEASTERN
ENVTL. L.J. 223 (2006). See also Erin Ryan, Public Trust and Distrust: The Theoretical
Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine for Natural Resource Management, 31 ENVTL. L.
477 (2001).
3
Two kinds of alleged takings have surfaced in the South Carolina Marsh Island debate: (1)
takings alleged when people who believe they own islands discover that, under the state’s
expansive public trust doctrine, they actually belong to the state, see generally Op. S. C.
Att’y Gen., 2003 S.C. AG LEXIS 231 (Dec. 5, 2003) (advising that, absent clear and
convincing evidence of a grant of ownership by the sovereign, the state presumptively owns
the marshlands); and (2) takings alleged when people who clearly do own private islands
contemplate being denied permission to build a bridge over public tidelands to access them,
see Ellison Smith, Attorney, Smith Bundy Bybee & Barnett, Presentation at the University of
South Carolina School of Law Southeastern Environmental Law Journal Symposium:
Bridging the Divide: Public and Private Interest in Coastal and Marsh Islands (Sept. 8, 2006)
available at http://www.law.sc.edu/elj/2006symposium/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2006). This piece
is exclusively concerned with the second category of alleged takings.
4
Palazzolo v. State, No. 88-0297, 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005)
(holding the public trust doctrine is a background principle of property law and can block
development on tidal lands), remanded, Palazzolo v. State, 785 A.2d 561 (R.I. 2001),
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After exploring the takings-related anxiety embedded in the South
Carolina bridge controversy, this essay reviews the Palazzolo saga through
its ultimate disposition on remand, and analyzes its significance not only for
the marsh island bridge debate but for the broader array of land use
controversies that involve wetlands, tidelands, and other submerged lands.
Rhode Island’s successful reliance on the public trust doctrine in defending
the Palazzolo claim on remand – bolstered by a related analysis in McQueen
v. South Carolina Coastal Council5 – suggests that regulatory takings claims
brought by disappointed bridge permit seekers are unlikely to succeed. Both
decisions hold that the public trust doctrine forms part of the background
principles of state law that inform private property owners’ reasonable
expectations about the potential uses of submerged lands.6 Because the
property owner’s “reasonable expectations” about development prospects
are a central consideration in the legal analysis of a regulatory takings
claim,7 recognition that the public trust doctrine limits their formation
regarding submerged lands strengthens the position of the state in this and
many other land use controversies that pit environmental protection of
wetlands and tidelands against opposing private property interests.
II. TAKINGS ANXIETY AND THE SOUTH CAROLINA MARSH ISLAND BRIDGE
CONTROVERSY
The State of South Carolina is no stranger to the special vexations of
managing fragile coastlands, having famously (and unsuccessfully)
defended in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council8 its ambitious
Beachfront Management Act,9 which attempted to protect eroding coastal
resources by curtailing development of private waterfront lands.10
Accordingly, the new marsh island bridge guidelines arrive amidst an
already charged debate about the appropriate balance of public and private
interests in the management of South Carolina’s unique coastal lands.
remanded, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), aff’g in part and rev’g in part,
Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tarvares, 746 A.2d 707, (R.I. 2000). The Superior Court's final
decision, No. 88-0297, is not reported in A.2.
5
McQueen v. S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 540 U.S. 982 (S.C. 2003).
6
Palazzolo v. State, No. 88-0297, 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108 at *25 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5,
2005) (not reported in A.2); McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119-120
(S.C. 1995).
7
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978).
8
505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (requiring compensation whenever a state regulation eliminates
all economically viable use of a parcel of private property).
9
S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280 (1988) (current version available at S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39280 (2006)).
10
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008-1009.
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A. South Carolina’s Marsh Islands and the New Guidelines
The South Carolina coastline pairs miles of ocean-fronting beach with
some 3,500 marsh islands that buffer the mainland shore.11 Many of these
islands are privately owned,12 but the prohibitive expense of bridge-building
has ensured that until recently, only the largest and most developed coastal
islands have been joined to the mainland by vehicular bridges.13 However,
the recent boom in coastal property values has shifted priorities among
many island owners, who are increasingly seeking State permission to erect
vehicular bridges that promise easier access and more profitable sales.14
The former guidelines – criticized as too strict by many disappointed
permit seekers and too permissive by many disappointed neighbors15 – were
invalidated in 2005 by the South Carolina Supreme Court,16 which held
them void for vagueness in failing to clearly establish which islands were
subject to the regulations in the first place.17 In the chaos that followed
dissolution of what regulatory guidance had once existed, clarion voices
were raised by stakeholders on all sides of the issue.18

11

See J. DAVID WHITAKER ET AL., S.C. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., AN ECOLOGICAL
CHARACTERIZATION OF COASTAL HAMMOCK ISLANDS IN SOUTH CAROLINA 1 (2004)
(cataloging the ecological value of South Carolina’s marsh islands), available at
http://www.csc.noaa.gov/id/DNR_Final_1_report_December.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2006);
see also S.C. Dep’t of Natural Res., COASTAL ZONE AND MARINE ECOREGION TERRESTRIAL
AND
AQUATIC
HABITATS
3
(2005),
available
at
http://www.dnr.sc.gov/cwcs/pdf/habitat/CoastalZoneHabitat.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2006).
12
See Saving the Marsh Islands, HERALD (Rock Hill), Nov. 23, 2004, at 5A. But see New
Safeguard for Marsh Islands, POST AND COURIER (Charleston), Dec. 30, 2003, at 10A
(reporting an opinion by the South Carolina Attorney General concluding marsh islands are
presumptively owned by the state absent a specific title grant from the state).
13
See generally Bo Petersen, Lawmakers Get a Fresh Look at Marsh Islands; Boat Tour an
Effort to Push New Rules to Govern Development, POST AND COURIER (Charleston), Mar. 7,
2006, at B1.
14
See WHITAKER ET AL., supra note 11, at 1.
15
Nancy Vinson, Dir. Water Quality and State Legislative Programs, Coastal Conservation
League, Presentation at the University of South Carolina School of Law Southeastern
Environmental Law Journal Symposium: Bridging the Divide: Public and Private Interest in
Coastal
Marshes
and
Marsh
Islands
(Sept.
8,
2006)
available
at
http://www.law.sc.edu/elj/2006symposium/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2006).
16
S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 610 S.E.2d 482
(S.C. 2005) (holding S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12 N (2005) void for vagueness).
17
Id. at 486 (holding that the guidelines, which governed bridge permits for “small islands,”
failed to define adequately the qualifier “small”).
18
See, e.g., Insist on Island Protections, POST AND COURIER (Charleston), Mar. 12, 2006, at
A10; Tommy Howard, Marsh Islands Legislation Pending, GEORGETOWN TIMES, Apr. 17,
2006,
available
at
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Coastal conservation advocates urged the State to limit bridge-building
in the coastal zone as much as possible, fearing the establishment of a vast
network of bridges that would fragment the tidelands and damage
vulnerable features of the coastal ecosystem.19 (After all, it was the
precarious state of South Carolina’s coast that had motivated the coastal
management agency to take the drastic step of foreclosing all development
on the now-famous oceanfront Isle of Palms parcel belonging to David
Lucas.) 20 Meanwhile, property rights advocates urged the State not to
further impede the realization of land owners’ investment-backed
expectations regarding valuable waterfront properties.21 (After all, Lucas’s
victory at the Supreme Court was considered a vindication of property
owners’ conviction that state regulation had already gone too far in
burdening coastal landowners for the benefit of the general public.)22 Debate
over the future direction of the regulatory guidelines was contentious, and
the result uncertain.23
Forged in the clash of this contest, the new guidelines seek a renewed
balance between these competing interests – one that provides meaningful
protection for the important public commons associated with coastal lands24
while remaining vigilant on behalf of private property rights (or at least
against further takings liability on the part of the State). The guidelines
foreclose the possibility of bridges to all islands measuring less than one
acre in area or lying either less than 100 or more than 1500 feet from
shore.25 Other claims are subjected to a balancing algorithm that considers
the size of the island, its distance from shore, and other pertinent details
http://www.zwire.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=16488698&BRD=2081&PAG=461&dept_id=
385210&rfi=6 (last visited Feb. 4, 2006).
19
See Restore Protections to Islands, POST AND COURIER (Charleston), Mar. 5, 2005, at 12A;
cf WHITAKER ET AL., supra note 11, at 100 (cataloging the ecological values of South
Carolina’s marsh islands). On the basis of the rich biological diversity that exists on small
marsh islands, the authors of the study urge policymakers that “[i]slands should not be
exempted from protection based upon size.” Id.
20
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008.
21
See generally Bo Petersen, Marsh Island Bridges in Flux; House Panel on Tuesday
Considers Controversial Rules, POST AND COURIER (Charleston), Apr. 16, 2006, at B1; Jacob
Jordan, Proposed State Rules at Center of Dispute Over Coastal Land, THE STATE
(Columbia), Mar. 19, 2006, at F1.
22
See, e.g., Gilbert Halverson, Editorial, Radical Environmentalists Stepping All Over Bill of
Rights, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison), Oct. 19, 1994, at 11A.
23
Jordan, supra note 21, at F1.
24
See, e.g., Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 2; Erin Ryan, New Orleans, the Chesapeake, and the
Future of Environmental Assessment: Overcoming the Natural Resources Law of Unintended
Consequences, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 981 (2006).
25
S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N)(2) (2006).
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suggesting either the potential for great ecological harm to public trust
values if a bridge were erected or great personal harm to the owner if a
sought-after permit were denied.26
The new guidelines imply that nearly 54% of all marsh islands (or 1,862
separate islands) would be automatically denied bridge permits because they
are smaller than one acre in size.27 Of the remaining 46%, a sizeable
percentage would also fail the requirements regarding distance from shore.28
Given the tenor of the debate preceding promulgation of the new guidelines,
we might expect considerable unhappiness among potentially large numbers
of island owners. Accordingly, there has been no shortage of speculation
about the potential for new takings litigation along the South Carolina
coast.29
B. Takings Anxiety Along the Coast
Still, one might fairly ask whether the “takings” question even properly
arises in this context. The very nature of the government’s action in denying
permission for an island owner’s proposed bridge is not suggestive of the
classical regulatory taking, in which a government regulation denies an
owner certain economically valuable use of her private property in service
of some legitimate public purpose. The bridge guidelines don’t even directly
regulate an owner’s use of her own land; rather, they address the way in
which the State uses its land – i.e., whether to use public trust tidelands for
the support of a bridge to a private island.30 And yet, anxiety about the
takings dimension of the new guidelines emanates from all sides of the
debate.31
26

Id.
See WHITAKER ET AL., supra note 11, at 1 (noting that “[t]here are approximately 3,467
coastal islands . . . [o]f these islands, 53.7% are less than once acre”).
28
Richard Chinnis & Debra Hernandez, South Carolina Coastal Marsh Island Management
Strategy, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 14TH BIENNIAL COASTAL ZONE CONFERENCE, NEW ORLEANS,
LA,
at
3
(July
17-21,
2005)
available
at
http://www.csc.noaa.gov/cz/2005/CZ05_Proceedings_CD/pdf%20files/Chinnis.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 4, 2006) (in a study of 2,076 islands unprotected from development and presently
without bridge access, finding that 44% (914) are greater than 1000 feet from shore, 10%
(207) are less than 50 feet from shore, and 46% (955) are less than 1000 feet from shore and
10% (207) of all islands are less than 50 feet from the shore).
29
Interview with Nancy Vinson, Dir. of Water Quality and State Legislative Programs,
Coastal Conservation League, in Columbia, SC (Sept. 8, 2006).
30
S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N)(1)(a) (2006).
31
Nancy Vinson, Dir. Water Quality and State Legislative Programs, Coastal Conservation
League, Henry McMaster, S.C. Attorney General, Ellison Smith, Attorney, Smith Bundy
Bybee & Barnett, Carolyn Risinger Boltin, Deputy Comm’r, Ocean and Coastal Res. Mgmt.
27

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=951840

Fall 2006]

PALAZZOLO, THE PUBLIC TRUST, AND THE PROPERTY OWNER

127

Anxiety on the part of DHEC, the state agency that authored the new
guidelines, is made evident by the precisely crafted language in key portions
of the guidelines themselves. For example, project standards regarding
“eligibility to apply for a bridge permit” highlight the tension between the
public and private interests at issue, and have clearly been designed in an
effort to balance both:
The decision on whether to issue or deny a permit for a bridge to a
coastal island must be made with due consideration of the impacts
to the public trust lands, critical area, coastal tidelands and coastal
waters, weighed against the reasonable expectations of the owner of
the coastal island. 32
The emphasized text is no accident; balancing public interests against “the
reasonable expectations” of private landowners reflects a critical element of
the general inquiry into whether a regulatory taking has occurred.33 An
exquisite sensitivity to such inquiries (perhaps acquired during the lengthy
Lucas litigation), may well have played a role in the agency’s decision to
include that very language here.
Meanwhile, island owners seeking permits under the new guidelines
have exhibited strong expectations that they are indeed entitled to build
bridges – expectations that, if violated, might create an impetus to sue for
compensation.34 For example, one South Carolina newspaper reported on
growing anxiety among island owners about the new guidelines in an article
published a few months before they were promulgated.35 Concerned that he
would not be able to bridge his small island to the mainland, Ted Mamunes
argued that his island would become virtually valueless to him without a

S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, Presentations at the University of South Carolina
School of Law Southeastern Environmental Law Journal Symposium: Bridging the Divide:
Public and Private Interests in Coastal Marshes and Marsh Islands (Sept. 8, 2006) available
at http://www.law.sc.edu/elj/2006symposium/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2006) (all presentations
noted concerns about takings).
32
S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N)(2)(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
33
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104 (setting forth the Supreme Court’s principal test for
determining whether a private owner may seek compensation under the Fifth Amendment for
partial economic deprivations associated with a land-use regulation). In Penn Central, the
Court held that the application of New York City’s historic landmarks law did not constitute
a compensable taking because the restrictions were aimed at benefiting the public welfare and
permitted beneficial use of the property. Id. at 124. See also infra, text accompanying note
116.
34
Jordan, supra note 21, at F1.
35
Id.
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bridge, lamenting that “[i]t’s useless to me if I can’t get to it.”36 Mamunes’
choice of words here is as significant as DHEC’s careful phrasing in the
guidelines, since a government regulation that deprives an owner of all
economic value is the very categorical taking established in Lucas.37 This is
the famous Lucas “total wipeout” rule,38 and given the South Carolina roots
of the case, it’s not surprising that it would be on the minds of both property
owners and regulators in the State.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine a claim relating to the marsh
island bridge guidelines ever falling within the ambit of the Lucas “total
wipeout” rule. Although Mr. Mamunes doubtlessly feels as though his island
would be useless without a bridge, it is almost certainly not the case. The
new guidelines create a very different kind of regulatory hardship for marsh
island owners than did the portions of the Beachfront Management Act
challenged in Lucas.39 Even if a bridge permit is denied, the island can still
be accessed by means other than automobile traffic. At minimum, islands
are usually accessible by watercraft of some kind, and thus amenable to
varying kinds of residential, retreat, and recreational purposes – foreclosing
the requisite “total wipeout” of economically viable use that triggers
automatic compensation under Lucas. But that is not necessarily the end of
the issue.
C. A Potential Claim under the Penn Central Balancing Test
A disappointed and determined owner may nevertheless allege a taking
under the “ad hoc” regulatory takings balancing test set forth in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,40 the standard means of
evaluating “partial” regulatory takings that leave at least some economically
viable use. In such cases, the plaintiff alleges that a state regulation so
36

Id.
Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (ruling that application of the South Carolina Beachfront
Management Act to a developer’s coastal property that deprived him of all economic benefit
constituted a taking requiring just compensation without regard to the public purposes served
by the regulation).
38
The court in Lucas set forth the “categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be
compensated.” Id. at 1026. Although Lucas established the “total wipeout” rule, the court in
Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States was the first to use the phrase. 208 F.3d 1374,
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000) remanded to 58 Fed. Cl. 657 ( Fed. Cl. 2003) (finding that the denial of
a permit to fill lake bottom constituted a categorical taking, but on remand, finding that denial
by the Army Corps. of Engineers was for a valid navigational purpose).
39
The Beachfront Management Act challenged in Lucas prohibited the developer from
building any occupiable structure on any part of the beachfront parcel at issue. 505 U.S. at
1008-09.
40
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
37
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compromises private property rights that it warrants compensation under the
Fifth Amendment even though possession remains with the owner.41 Under
the three factors of the Penn Central test, courts consider: (1) the character
of the government action, (2) the economic impact of the regulation on the
owner, and (3) – as the new regulations anticipate – the extent to which the
challenged regulation interferes with the “reasonable, investment-backed
expectations” of the landowner.42
Even by this route, however, most takings claims would encounter high
hurdles, especially under the first prong. Courts evaluate the character of the
government action in considering its intrusiveness or unfairness with regard
to the challenging landowner.43 The more the regulation appears to single
out individual owners to finance a collective benefit (or effectuates a
permanent physical invasion by third party interlopers44), the more likely it
is to be held a taking. But the new bridge guidelines should easily survive
scrutiny under this prong, as they neither single out individual landowners45
nor imply a physical occupation46 – nor, as aforementioned, do they even
directly regulate the landowner.47 Although the guidelines can fairly be
considered land use regulations, they circumscribe not the owner’s use of
privately owned land but the management decisions of the state on what is
concededly public land.48 This point might well prove dispositive of the
entire claim, exposing a pivotal weakness that even extraordinary showings
under the other prongs might not overcome. Nevertheless, it is worth
probing the arguments under the remaining two prongs, both to exhaust the
claim and to explore the significance of the analysis for related takings
claims involving submerged lands.
We thus turn to the second consideration, which inquires into the
economic impact of the regulation on the owner.49 Most challengers are
unlikely to fare much better under the economic impact prong of the test, by
which the likelihood that the regulation will be held a taking tracks the
degree of economic loss suffered by the private owner.50 The more loss is
suffered in comparison to what value remains, the more likely a court is to
41

Id.
Id.
43
See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
44
See, e.g., Lorretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
45
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 132.
46
Id. at 124.
47
See discussion, supra Part II.B.; S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N)(1)(a) (2006).
48
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 131. See also Ryan, supra note 24.
49
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
50
Id.
42
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find a taking.51 However, though the economic impacts of a permit denial
may prove considerable (in that a bridged island might prove more
profitable overall than an island without a bridge), the regulations leave
considerable economic value in coastal islands that can still be accessed by
means other than cars, demonstrated by the high market value of even those
islands that lack bridge access.52 As the Penn Central Transportation
Company learned when it failed to win compensation for the opportunity
loss of potential profits from a forbidden high rise office complex over
Grand Central Station, takings law has never required that the government
permit the most economically valuable use of land.53 That’s why the
economic impact analysis is closely intertwined with the final prong of the
test, which considers the owner’s reasonable, investment-backed
expectations.54
The “reasonable expectations” prong of the test considers whether an
owner deserves compensation for the loss of a right to use her land in a way
that she had reasonably anticipated and substantially relied on.55 Clearly, it
is the “reasonable expectations” prong of the test that so motivated DHEC’s
careful phrasing of how the state should consider bridge permit
applications.56 And just as clearly, many coastal landowners are concerned
about the extent to which the new guidelines might frustrate their
expectations.57 Everyone seems to expect that this part of the analysis could
get tricky in application to the marsh island bridge controversy. But what,
exactly, is a “reasonable” expectation?
The “reasonable expectations” prong is the most interesting and also the
most unsettled in the analysis, leaving important questions unresolved. First,
51

Id.
For example, despite the lack of bridge access, the marsh island development Dewees
Island advertises at substantial values for its remaining lots which range from $260,000 to
$2,575,000. Dewees Island, http://www.deweesisland.com (last visited Feb. 4, 2006).
53
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S at 125 (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,
592-93 (1962)) (using zoning laws as an example of a valid government action that prohibits
the most economically beneficial use of the land); see also Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning law upheld in spite of 75% diminution in value of real property
caused by the zoning law).
54
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124-25.
55
Id.
56
See S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N)(1)(a) (2006) (“The decision on whether to issue or
deny a permit for a bridge to a coastal island must be made with due consideration of the
impacts to the public trust lands, critical area, coastal tidelands and coastal waters, weighed
against the reasonable expectations of the owner of the coastal island.” (emphasis added));
see also Jordan, supra note 21.
57
See Jordan, supra note 21, at F1; see also discussion, supra Part II B.
52
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what is it that creates a reasonable expectation with which a challenged
regulation might interfere? In later cases, the Court has suggested that an
owner’s expectations hinge on the “background principles” of a state’s law
of property and nuisance,58 but what exactly does that mean? What does and
doesn’t count as part of the background principles of state law that inform
reasonable expectations? It can’t be that the background principles include
all state laws, because if that were the case, no takings challenge could ever
succeed on this prong of the analysis; the challenged law would simply be
part of the set of principles that create an owner’s legitimate expectations.
But both statutory law and common law evolve over time, so how do we
distinguish the subset legitimately informing an owner’s reasonable
expectations from the rest that don’t?
Perhaps the more fruitful question to ask is: what can legitimately
destroy expectations that might have been reasonable under a previous state
of affairs? Can any new law render a previously reasonable expectation
newly “unreasonable” without effecting a taking? To take a popular
example in this age of increasing concern over nationwide wetlands loss,
what about a modern wetlands-protective statutory scheme that withdraws
much privately owned coastal land from further development? As critical a
natural resource management strategy as this might be, we can at least
appreciate the frustration of a long-time coastal land owner who hears about
the new law just as she raises a hammer to break ground on a new
foundation. But what about a would-be developer that takes title to the
restricted land after passage of the new wetlands law? Can he claim that the
law interferes with his reasonable expectations for development in such a
circumstance? Indeed, these are the very facts that attracted the Supreme
Court’s attention in another of its recent landmark takings decisions,
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.59
Given the unfavorable analyses we would expect under the first two
prongs of the Penn Central60 balancing test, a plaintiff challenging the new
marsh island bridge guidelines could only hope to prevail on the force this
third prong.61 But the recent aftermath of Palazzolo suggests that – to the
58

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-1030; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626-30
(2001).
59
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), aff’g in part and rev’g in part, Palazzolo
v. State ex rel. Tarvares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000).
60
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
61
As aforementioned, even the most powerful “expectations” argument might fail to
overcome unfavorable analyses on the “character” and “economic impact” prongs.
Nevertheless, probing the “expectations” argument enables us not only to exhaust the claim
but to explore the significance of the Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, remand and
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probable relief of the State and the likely disappointment of some
landowners – the “reasonable expectations” prong will provide no haven.
III. PALAZZOLO AND THE PROBLEM OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
Although Anthony Palazzolo originally brought suit in Rhode Island,62
the story of Palazzolo might be rightly described as beginning in South
Carolina, with the Lucas decision.
As aforementioned,63 Lucas set forth the “total wipeout” rule requiring
compensation whenever a regulation causes a landowner to lose 100% of all
economically viable use of her land, regardless of the important social
benefits that the regulation might confer.64 The Lucas “total wipeout” rule
can be understood as clarifying the Penn Central analysis at the extreme end
of the “economic impact” inquiry, directing that the court’s consideration of
the “character” and “expectations” prongs approaches zero whenever the
economic impact inquiry points to a 100% loss by the owner. Still, Lucas
preserved a key exception, indicating that even in such cases of total
deprivation, there is no taking if the desired use prevented by the regulation
is one that the owner never had the right to engage in anyway – for example,
one that would create a public or private nuisance.65 Although this
reservation became known as the Lucas “nuisance exception,”66 it is really
an inquiry into the “background principles” of state law that tell us whether
the owner had the right to engage in the prohibited use to begin with67 – i.e.,
whether that right was ever a stick in the proverbial bundle that he acquired
when he took title.68 As such, we might better understand the nuisance

McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, decision on related takings challenges
that implicate the public trust doctrine in South Carolina and elsewhere.
62
Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746, A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000).
63
See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
64
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030-31 (1992).
65
Id. at 1027-30.
66
Id. at 1030. See Patrick Wiseman, May the Market do what Taking Jurisprudence Does
Not: Divide a Single Parcel into Discrete Segments?, 19 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 269, 273-274 (2006)
(discussing the new Lucas nuisance exception) and Gary Lawson, Katharine Ferguson &
Guillermo A. Montero,“Oh Lord, Please Don’t Let Me be Misunderstood!”: Rediscovering
the Mathews v. Eldridge and Penn Central Frameworks, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 42-43
(2005) (discussing the Rhode Island court’s use of the Lucas nuisance exception in
Palazzolo).
67
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-1030; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626-630
(2001).
68
In other words, “if the contested use was not one acquired by the owner at purchase, the
takings claim must be rejected at the outset due to lack of a protected property interest.”
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exception as the Lucas “No Stick Taken” affirmative defense. But why is
any of this relevant to Anthony Palazzolo? Because he arrived at the Rhode
Island Superior Court claiming (albeit in a novel way) that he was the victim
of a Lucas “total wipeout.”
Mr. Palazzolo owned waterfront real property, of which approximately
80% were wetlands adjacent to a pond and the remaining 20% uplands
overlooking the pond.69 At the time that he took title to the parcel, a
statewide regulatory program limited the filling and development of
wetlands like those in the lowland portion of his parcel.70 When he sought
permission to develop both the upland and wetland parts of the property, he
was granted permission to build two lots in the uplands portion but denied
permission to fill the wetlands to make them suitable for residential
development.71
Palazzolo claimed that the regulation preventing him from developing
the wetland portion of his property constituted a “total wipeout” of the value
of that lowland portion of the property,72 raising interesting interpretive
questions about the appropriate denominator in performing the total-wipeout
analysis.73 Palazzolo’s attempt to cast his loss as a categorical taking under
Lucas proved unsuccessful,74 and his case would ultimately be decided as a
partial taking claim under the Penn Central regulatory takings balancing
test.75 But the case that would bear his name may prove critical in fleshing
out some of the more unsettled areas of both rules, such as the nature of
“reasonable expectations” under Penn Central and the scope of the No Stick
Taken defense under Lucas (at least regarding coastal development in states
like Rhode Island and South Carolina).

Michael Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background
Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 327 (2005).
69
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. at 612-14 The facts presented here are simplified to
reflect only those relevant to the “reasonable expectations” inquiry that is the subject of this
discussion. An additional description of the Palazzolo property can be found in Palazzolo v.
State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 709, 710 (R.I. 2000), and Brief of Defendant-Appellees,
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, No. 98-333A (R.I. 1999), WL 34749043.
70
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. at 614-615.
71
Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d at 715.
72
See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. at 630.
73
See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV 1165, 1192 (1967).
74
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. at 630-31.
75
Palazzolo v. State, No. 88-0297, 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108 at *34 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5,
2005) (not reported in A.2).
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A. Palazzolo to the U.S. Supreme Court
Palazzolo lost all the way to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, which
decided there had been no taking on the simple grounds that there had been
no frustration of reasonable, investment-backed expectations.76 In the Rhode
Island high court’s view, the wetlands regulations that had been in place
when he took title prevented Palazzolo from forming any reasonable
expectation that he would ever be able to develop his new lowland property
in the way he had planned.77
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that a regulatory takings
claim is not necessarily barred for lack of reasonable expectations simply
because the challenged regulation precedes the owner’s title.78 Otherwise, it
reasoned, the state could immunize itself against future challenges simply by
passing a broad set of new legal restrictions and waiting for title in the
affected properties to pass over time.79 Remanding back to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court for final determination,80 the Court advised that the
appropriate inquiry concerns reasonable expectations as against the
“background principles” of the State’s law of property and nuisance.81
And yet this answer leaves us adrift amid the continuing uncertainty
about what qualifies as the relevant “background principles” that inform
reasonable expectations. Apparently, the modern Rhode Island wetlands
regulation did not – but then how far back in time must we look to find
them? As some commentators have asked, must we go all the way back to
the common law in 1789?82 Unlikely, since even Lucas acknowledged that
background principles might evolve over time,83 suggesting that they are not
simply frozen artifacts from the time of a state’s entry to the union.84 But if
76

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. at 616-17.
Id. at 616.
78
Id. at 632. Palazzolo also addressed important takings questions regarding conceptual
severance (on remand), Palazzolo v. State, 2005 RI Super. LEXIS 108 at *34-49, and
ripeness, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. at 616-625, but these are not relevant for the
purposes of this discussion.
79
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. at 628-30.
80
Id. at 630.
81
Id. at 626, 629; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
82
Many commentators have asked this question, and most have answered in the negative.
See, e.g., Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 68; J.B. Ruhl, The Background Principles of Natural
Capital and Ecosystem Services—Did Lucas Open Pandora’s Box? (Fla. State Univ. Pub.
Law
Research
Paper
No.
214)
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=928656 (last visited Feb. 4, 2006).
83
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031 (observing that “changed circumstances may make what was
previously permissible no longer so”).
84
See, e.g., Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 68.
77
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principles can change over time, but modern legislative enactments don’t
count – how do we define the operative set? Palazzolo thus raised new
questions about the Lucas rule without answering the persisting old
question: how do we know whether an owner’s expectations are
reasonable?
B. Palazzolo on Remand to the R.I. Courts
After receiving Palazzolo on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Superior Court
where the original bench trial had been held with instructions to examine
Palazzolo’s claim under the principles established in Penn Central.85
Although the Rhode Island Superior Court’s unpublished final decision does
not resolve the more general reasonable expectations quandary, it does
provide meaningful guidance for land use controversies involving
submerged lands by clarifying a critical state law “background principle.”
Without answering the ultimate “what counts?” question, the court resolved
that at the very least, the background principles of state law do include the
public trust doctrine, and that the public trust doctrine can legitimately
foreclose reasonable expectations for development that would imperil trust
values.86 On remand, the Rhode Island courts applied the Supreme Court’s
Penn Central and Palazzolo analyses and affirmed the original conclusion
that there had been no taking, explaining its conclusion on the basis of three
separate grounds: public nuisance, a tentative “No Stick Taken” rationale,
and a full Penn Central takings analysis.87
First, the court held that filling these wetlands would have constituted a
public nuisance,88 enabling the state’s affirmative defense under Lucas that a
regulation preventing a use that would have constituted a common law
nuisance is not a taking.89 The public nuisance rationale is intriguing, but

85

Palazzolo v. State, No. 88-0297, 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108 (R.I. Super. July 5, 2005) (not
reported in A.2), remanded, Palazzolo v. State, 785 A.2d 561 (R.I. 2001), remanded,
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), aff’g in part and rev’g in part, Palazzolo v.
State ex rel. Tarvares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000).
86
Palazzolo v. State, 785 A.2d 561.
87
Palazzolo v. State, No. 88-0297, 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108 (not reported in A.2).
88
Id. at *20-21 (finding the proposed development was expected to result in nitrogen levels
elevated to a degree that would damage water quality and wildlife values associated with the
pond, constituting an anticipatory public nuisance).
89
Id. at *20 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029) (reserving the question of whether the nuisance
exception applies only in cases of “total wipeout,” or whether it applies more generally to
claims of partial regulatory takings such as this one).
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relevant to the South Carolina inquiry only if a marsh island bridge could be
held to constitute a public nuisance.
Second, it held that Palazzolo had suffered no taking because Rhode
Island’s longstanding public trust doctrine makes clear that he never held the
right to develop these wetlands in the first place.90 Recognizing that the
public trust doctrine protects tidewaters for “commerce, navigation, and
fishery,”91 U.S. Supreme Court precedent establishes that the precise
contours of the doctrine are applied based on state law.92 The Rhode Island
court determined that, both constitutionally93 and at common law,94 Rhode
Island’s public trust doctrine prohibits the kind of development that
Palazzolo sought.95 In Rhode Island, the doctrine empowers and obligates
the state, as trustee, to manage submerged lands (including those on private
holdings)96 to protect the scenic, recreational, and ecological trust values
that would be lost were the targeted wetlands filled for development.97 The
State had first argued that the public trust doctrine prevented it from
granting the permission Palazzolo sought in its 1999 brief to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court,98 before certiorari was granted to the U.S. Supreme
Court. The Rhode Island court was thus comfortable in applying the
antecedent “background principles” analysis suggested in Lucas to find that
the rights Palazzolo claimed were “not part of his title to begin with,” and
that as a result, nothing has been taken from him when the state denied his
subsequent permit applications.99
At this point in its analysis, the court thus flirted with the Lucas No
Stick Taken defense, finding that, as part of the background principles of
90

Palazzolo v. State, 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108 at *26.
Id. at *26-27 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 US 1 (1894)).
92
Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Shively, 152 U.S. at 15.
93
Palazzolo v. State, 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108 at *28 (noting the public trust doctrine is
incorporated in the R.I. CONST. art. 1, §17).
94
See, e.g., Champlin’s Realty Assoc. L.P. v. Tillson, 823 A.2d 1162 (R.I. 2003); Warren v.
Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d 1255 (R.I. 1999).
95
Palazzolo v. State, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 108 at *29 (citing Warren, 740 A.2d at 1255,
1259-60).
96
See, e.g., Champlin’s Realty Assocs. L.P., 823 A.2d at 1167 (holding that the State can
cede trust resource ownership while retaining rights and powers under the public trust
doctrine).
97
See Michelle A. Ruberto & Kathleen A. Ryan, The Public Trust Doctrine and Legislative
Regulation in Rhode Island: A Legal Framework Providing Greater Access to Coastal
Resources in the Ocean State, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 353, 378-379 (1990).
98
Brief of Defendant-Appellees at *34, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, No. 98-333A (R.I. 1999),
WL 34749043.
99
Palazzolo v. State, 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108 at *24-25 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027).
91
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state law, the public trust doctrine so governed the acquisition of property
rights in Rhode Island that Palazzolo’s bundle had never included a stick
that would empower him to fill those wetlands without sovereign
permission.100 Moreover, the doctrine makes clear that such permission
would not be forthcoming if the proposal would compromise trust values.101
Thus, when permission was refused, Palazzolo should not have been
surprised – and he certainly could not claim that the state had frustrated any
“reasonable expectations.”102 However, the court conceded uncertainty
regarding whether the No Stick Taken defense may be applied outside the
scope of a Lucas total wipeout claim, leaving this part of its analysis
vulnerable to challenge.103 Other courts104 and commentators105 have
reasoned that the underlying logic of what this piece calls the “No Stick
Taken” defense must apply to any kind of takings challenge, because
whether the property right claimed violated was actually owned by the
claimant should not hinge on whether the claim is one for total or partial
deprivation of economic use. Nevertheless, the Rhode Island court
acknowledged this potential problem – but found it unnecessary to resolve
in light of its third ground for decision.106
C. Penn Central, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the Property Owner’s
Reasonable Expectations
Most significant for submerged lands disputes like the marsh island
bridge controversy is the court’s third analysis, by which it found no taking
under the Penn Central balancing test notwithstanding the first two grounds
for defeat of Palazzolo’s claim.107 The regulation survived scrutiny under the
“character of the government action” inquiry, since the permit was denied
based on the State’s interpretation of a neutral rule of general applicability
that did not unduly single out Palazzolo.108 In addition, the court held that
the “economic impact” inquiry undermined Palazzolo’s claim, finding that
the regulation’s foreclosure of wetland development was actually more
100

Id. at *57.
Id. at *27 (citing Shively, 152 U.S. at 57-58).
102
Id.
103
Id. at *25-26.
104
See, e.g., Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 68, at 327 n.28 (listing decisions from the Sixth
and Federal Circuits so holding).
105
See, e.g., id. at 327; DOUGLAS T. KENDALL ET AL., TAKINGS LITIGATION HANDBOOK:
DEFENDING TAKINGS CHALLENGES TO LAND USE REGULATIONS 117 (2000) (recognizing that
the background principles defense applies to all inverse condemnation claims).
106
Palazzolo v. State, 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108 at *57-59.
107
Id.
108
Id. at *36.
101
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likely to enhance the overall value of the property than reduce it.109 Finally,
the court found that the regulation did not interfere with reasonable,
investment-backed expectations, because, once again, Palazzolo had no
reasonable investment-backed expectations.110 But its reasoning here
departed from its similar conclusion earlier, on three grounds.
First, the court concluded that ample evidence existed to put a
reasonable investor on notice that this property was not likely to yield a
profitable land venture, such that no investor should have developed
reasonable expectations of the sort Palazzolo claimed.111 After all, previous
investors had clearly realized that the large acreage of wetlands on this
parcel would subject any development proposal to the uncertainties of
seeking dredge and fill permission, and had left this parcel on the market
long after all neighboring parcels had been purchased from the original
owner.112 As the court noted, “Constitutional takings law does not
compensate bad business decisions.”113 Second, the court cited evidence
from early in the proceedings that Palazzolo himself knew the investment
was unlikely to be very successful, having testified at trial that of all the lots
for sale in the vicinity, he knew that he had purchased “the worst of them,”
and the last of them to sell.114 The court reasoned that he could not have
suffered interference with reasonable expectations if even he did not expect
much from this particular investment.115
But most important for our purposes, the court held that the public trust
doctrine, as part of the State of Rhode Island’s background law of property,
precluded Palazzolo from ever forming reasonable expectations that he
would be able to fill wetlands such as these.116 The court applied reasoning
similar to that underlying its second alternative holding, but here in a robust
context immune from any vulnerability associated with applying the Lucas

109

The court made this determination based on evidence forecasting that Palazzolo could
expect a lower return on investment if he undertook the expensive prospect of developing
even the wetland lots than he could expect from developing only the upland parcels (and
reaping the higher prices they would command overlooking an undeveloped marsh than they
would overlooking a residential subdivision). Id. at *45-46.
110
Id. at *59.
111
Id. at *51-56.
112
Palazzolo v. State, 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108 at *51.
113
Id. at *52.
114
Id. at *49.
115
Id. at *50 (“The third prong of the Penn Central analysis . . . clearly requires a
determination of realistically achievable economic goals.”).
116
Id. *25.
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No Stick Taken defense in a Penn Central partial taking context.117 The
State’s background principles of law determine which sticks – which rights
– Palazzolo acquired when he took title to the land, and accordingly,
informed his reasonable expectations about the extent of those rights.118 The
framing of Palazzolo’s expectations around the background principle of the
public trust doctrine fits squarely within the third factor of the Penn Central
test,119 even if the No Stick Taken defense has not yet been approved by the
U.S. Supreme Court to stand as an independent ground on which to deny a
partial takings claim. The Penn Central analysis requires consideration of
the owner’s reasonable expectations,120 and the Rhode Island Supreme Court
easily concluded that the State’s strong public trust doctrine foreclosed the
very formation of reasonable expectations in this case.121
The Palazzolo remand does not suggest a unifying theory to define
“background principles” generally, nor does it establish what properly
informs an owner’s “reasonable expectations” in all cases, but it does
provide meaningful guidance to states, owners, and the courts that mediate
their claims over the legal boundaries between public and private interests in
coastal and wetland areas.122 The Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence has
given us a tool with which to think about an important aspect of private
rights that requires protection against public incursion, which are the
investments that owners make in reasonable reliance on the background
principle of state law. While it remains unclear exactly how deep legal rules
must run before they earn a place among these principles, the public trust
doctrine – long received as common law in most states and often adopted
constitutionally as well123 – is easily among them. The public trust doctrine
establishes a set of sticks in submerged land that remain held by the
public,124 even when the others in the bundle are taken privately. And when
117

Id.
Palazzolo v. State, 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108 at *25.
119
Id. at *24-25.
120
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
121
Palazzolo v. State, 2005 RI Super LEXIS 108 at *24-25.
122
See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. at 627.
123
See Ryan, supra note 2, at 478-79.
124
Some commentators have expressed anxiety that the public trust doctrine may be too
amorphous – too dangerously vulnerable to expansion – to be entrusted among the
background principles of state law. See, e.g., Barton Thompson, Jr., Robert E. Paradise
Professor of Natural Resources, Stanford Law School, Keynote Address at the University of
South Carolina School of Law Southeastern Environmental Law Journal Symposium:
Bridging the Divide: Public and Private Interests in Coastal Marshes and Marsh Islands
(Sept. 7, 2006) available at http://www.law.sc.edu/elj/2006symposium/ (last visited Feb. 4,
2006). Nevertheless, as the common law trust remains almost universally rooted in
118
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the public exercises the rights represented by these sticks, nothing has been
taken.
IV. PALAZZOLO, MCQUEEN, AND THE MARSH ISLAND BRIDGE
CONTROVERSY
The Palazzolo remand is highly suggestive of how the third prong of a
partial regulatory taking claim under the marsh island bridge guidelines – or,
indeed, under any wetland or tideland protective regulation – might be
entertained in a state with a strong public trust doctrine, such as South
Carolina.
As an unpublished Rhode Island case, the Palazzolo remand is not
binding in South Carolina, but similarities between coastal management
issues and the strong articulations of the public trust doctrine in both states
make it persuasive precedent. Like Rhode Island, South Carolina has a rich
tradition of the public trust doctrine, both at common law125 and
constitutionally.126 Rhode Island’s constitutional statement of the public
trust doctrine127 is more explicitly protective of ecological concerns than
South Carolina’s, which stresses protection for navigability values,128 but the
South Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted the doctrine to protect
considerations also including “marine life, water quality, and public access”
relating to trust resources.129 Even this distinction may be of little practical
consequence in this discussion, since tideland bridges could interfere with
both ecological and navigational values.

application to submerged lands even after decades of attempts to expand its scope, see Ryan,
supra note 2, at 490, such anxiety may be unwarranted.
125
See, e.g., State v. Pac. Guano Co., 22 S.C. 50 (S.C. 1883); Cape Romaine Land &
Improvement Co. v. Ga.-Car. Canning Co., 148 S.C. 428 (S.C. 1926); State v. Hardee, 193
S.E.2d 497 (S.C. 1972).
126
S.C. CONST. art. XIV, §4; S.C. Code Ann. §49-1-20 (2005). The language from the South
Carolina Constitution reads: “[a]ll navigable waters shall forever remain public highways free
to the citizens of the State and the United States without tax, impost or toll imposed; and no
tax, impost or wharfage shall be imposed . . . unless the same be authorized by the General
Assembly.” Id.
127
R.I. CONST. art. 1, §17.
128
S.C. CONST. art. XIV, §4 (stating “all navigable waters shall forever remain public
highways . . . .”).
129
Sierra Club v. Kiawah Resort Associates, 456 S.E. 2d 397 (S.C. 1995); See also McQueen
v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119 (S.C. 2003) (finding restricting development of
artificial tidelands was not a compensable taking as a result of the limits of the public trust
doctrine), cert. denied, McQueen v. S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 540 U.S. 982
(2003).
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In addition, analogous No Stick Taken reasoning was recently employed
by the South Carolina Supreme Court in McQueen v. South Carolina
Coastal Council,130 a case in which an owner brought and lost a true Lucas
takings claim. The McQueen case, which followed Palazzolo to the
Supreme Court before its remand back to South Carolina, makes a jump by
the No Stick Taken rationale from the Lucas to the Penn Central context
perhaps inevitable.
A. McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council
In McQueen, an owner had purchased two contiguous lots on manmade
saltwater canals in Myrtle Beach with the hopes of developing them for
residential purposes.131 Continuous erosion of the property caused the
majority to revert to tidelands and critical area saltwater wetlands.132 When
McQueen filed applications with the State to backfill his lots to make them
solid enough to support structures, there was already insufficient high
ground to develop anything at all.133 The State denied his request to backfill
the lots because doing so would permanently destroy the critical areas that
had been established by the natural process of erosion, even though the
waterways were originally manmade.134 McQueen claimed a categorical
taking under Lucas, since the remaining high ground was insufficient in size
to enable any economically viable development at all.135
Although McQueen prevailed in a lower court, the South Carolina
Supreme Court reversed, finding that no taking had occurred because the
wetlands regulations that pre-dated McQueen’s title prevented him from
forming reasonable expectations with which the subsequent permit denials
could have interfered.136 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and then
remanded to South Carolina for further consideration in light of its holding
in Palazzolo that pre-existing regulations were not dispositive of the
question whether an owner could have formed reasonable expectations with
which the state had unduly interfered.137

130

580 S.E.2d 119.
Id. at 117.
132
Id. at 118.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 119.
136
Id. at 118.
137
Id. at 118-119.
131
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On remand, the South Carolina Supreme Court again found no taking,
and like the Palazzolo remand, in light of the public trust doctrine.138 Under
South Carolina’s public trust doctrine, it reasoned, the state holds
presumptive title to tidelands and land below the mean high water mark as
trustee for the public benefit.139 Under South Carolina law, wetlands created
by the encroachment of navigable waters belongs to the State and proof that
this encroachment of water occurred after the time of grant does not defeat
the title.140 As a result, the reversion to tidelands effected a restriction on
McQueen’s property rights inherent in the ownership of all property
bordering tidal water in the State of South Carolina.141 The court thus
applied the No Stick Taken defense in an unassailable Lucas context: no
stick had been taken from McQueen, reasoned the court, because the lost
right to fill was one that had never been part of his bundle under the
background principles of South Carolina property law.142
Reference to the public trust doctrine, which first appeared in Palazzolo
in the State’s brief to the Rhode Island Supreme Court in 1999143, appeared
in the McQueen litigation relatively later, in the State’s brief to the South
Carolina Supreme Court in 2002.144 Whether or not it was the highly visible
nature of the Palazzolo litigation that suggested the possibility of relying on
the public trust doctrine in McQueen, the use of the No Stick Taken
rationale in the McQueen remand,145 taken together with the analogous
reasonable expectations reasoning in the Palazzolo remand,146 suggests
another formidable defense against any takings claims raised by disgruntled
marsh island bridge applicants.
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Id. at 120.
Id. (citing State v. Yelsen Land Co., 216 S.E. 2d 876 (S.C. 1975) (extending public trust
doctrine presumptive title by state from lands below the high water mark to include
tidelands)).
140
Id. (citing Coburg Dairy Inc. v. Lesser, 458 S.E. 2d 547 (S.C. 1995); State v. Fain, 259
S.E. 2d 606 (S.C. 1979)).
141
McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 119-120.
142
Id.
143
Brief of Defendant-Appellees, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, No. 98-333A at *11 (R.I. 1999),
WL 34749043.
144
Brief of Petitioner, McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, No. 94-CP-26-3154 at 17 (S.C.
2003) (No. 256642).
145
McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 119-120.
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Palazzolo v. State, No. 88-0297, 2005 R.I. Super LEXIS 108 at *25 (R.I. Super. July 5,
2005) (not reported in A.2).
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B. Implications for the Marsh Island Bridge Controversy
South Carolina’s public trust doctrine easily falls within the background
principles of state property law.147 Perhaps most notorious is the long line of
public trust cases extending as far back as the 1880s establishing that
ownership of tidelands and marsh islands rests presumptively with the state,
and can only be shown to have transferred to private owners by their
presentation of an express grant.148 This, then, is a doctrine that requires
South Carolinians to prove a chain of title extending all the way back to the
King of England to avoid potential divestment to the state of ownership
interests claimed in a marsh island.149 Thus, perhaps even more than in most
states, the reasonable expectations of South Carolina marsh island owners
must be tempered by knowledge of the doctrine as among the background
principles of state law.
In this way, the South Carolina public trust doctrine forecloses any
reasonable expectations by an island owner of a protected legal right to lay a
bridge over public tidelands. Permission to build a bridge through public
tidelands can only take place at the discretion of the State, which owns and
manages public tidelands for the public benefit.150 Allowing too many
bridges to be built in the tidelands could seriously undermine the state’s
obligations as trustee, and so a successful application for a bridge permit can
never be presumed; there is always a reasonable chance that a permit might
be denied. Accordingly, in the Penn Central analysis we began above in
Part II, the third prong of the test would be equally unkind to a disappointed
bridge permit applicant seeking compensation for economic loss associated
with a permit denial. Even if the “character of the government action” and
“economic impact” inquiries were not dispositive of such a claim (despite
strong arguments that they should be),151 the State would almost certainly
prevail on the “expectations” inquiry by showing that the South Carolina
public trust doctrine has always foreclosed any possible reasonable
expectations by property owners that their bundles included a “bridge stick,”
or right of automotive access.
This analysis may disappoint some owners, but the result should not be
surprising, especially when analogized to like circumstances. Although
homebuilder Ted Mamunes lamented that his island “is useless if [he] can’t
147

See generally Pac. Guano Co., 22 S.C. at 84 (1883); see also Hardee, 193 S.E.2d 497;
Rice Hope Plantation v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 59 S.E.2d 132 (S.C. 1950).
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See cases cited supra note 147.
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See generally Pac. Guano Co., 22 S.C. at 50.
150
See McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 118-119.
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See discussion supra Part II.C.
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get to it,”152 we’ve already established that this is unlikely, and that we can
better understand his complaint as one that his island, sans bridge, is
difficult to get to, and thus less valuable than it might become if it were
more conveniently accessible by cars. But indeed, the same is true of all
inconveniently located property, which might command higher property
values if only access were somehow made easier. For owners like Mr.
Mamunes, the relevant question becomes: to what extent should the State
subsidize individual owners of inconveniently located property? For
example:
•

Could a shop owner whose property exists on the far side of an
interstate assert a right to build a bridge across the interstate to a
bustling economic area, just because it will make her store more
profitable? (Not likely.)

•

Would a landowner with property on the far side of a public park
preserved for scenic views, habitat, and public recreation be allowed
to pave a driveway through the park, so as to procure more
convenient access to the rest of town? (Probably not.)

•

Accordingly, should an owner of a small island reasonably expect
that the state owes her permission to build a bridge through
tidelands preserved in a natural state for public trust benefits
associated with navigation, marine life, water quality, and public
access and recreation?

The best basis for any such expectation in this last example might
simply be that similarly situated owners on other islands have been able to
build the bridges they wanted, implying that later-applying owners should
be able to count on similar bridges as well. But this is a classic problem in
land use management, frequently arising in the case of new zoning
regulations, where early acting owners’ land uses do not ensure similar
permission for later acting owners.153 By analogy, if a bridge that would not
receive approval under the new guidelines is already in place, it is a prior
non-conforming use that may continue, even though later permits for similar
bridges may be denied.154 If a bridge that would not receive approval under
152

Jordan, supra note 21, at F1.
See generally 83 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning §§ 555-627 (2006) (discussing the
general rules of zoning and exceptions for prior non-conforming uses, variances, and vested
rights); see also Bradford W. Wyche, An Overview of Land Use Regulation in South
Carolina, 11 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 183 (2003).
154
See Zoning and Planning, supra note 153, at § 555 (“A nonconforming use is a structure
or other use prohibited by the zoning regulations, but permitted because it existed when the
153
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the new guidelines was substantially on the way to being built before they
went into effect, then that owner probably has the truly “reasonable,
investment-backed expectation” that warrants an exception along the lines
of a vested right.155 But the simple fact that an owner always thought she’d
be able to do it later because others had done so earlier holds little weight in
the zoning context, and should similarly hold little weight in the permitting
of marsh island bridges.
Still, none of this means that South Carolina should be completely
unconcerned with owners’ reasonable, investment-backed expectations
when setting coastal land use regulations. There remain good policy-based
reasons to consider such expectations – the same policy-based reasons that
underlie their inclusion in the Penn Central balancing test in the first place.
In some cases, such as those involving claims for bridge infrastructure by
owners systematically denied infrastructure for invidiously discriminatory
reasons at a time when other groups were so rewarded,156 perhaps the State
should affirmatively exercise its discretion to build a bridge in spite of
competing considerations. These questions remain due for consideration in
the ad hoc, case-by-case fashion that regulations affecting land – the least
fungible of all resources – have always required.157
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the state may choose to consider the investment-backed
expectations of landowners in making decisions about who should get a
permit to build a bridge in public tidelands, and perhaps it should weigh that
consideration more heavily in some cases than others. However, takings law
does not require it in Rhode Island and South Carolina, where the public
trust doctrine precludes owners from ever forming such “reasonable
expectations” as a legal matter. Taken together, the Palazzolo and McQueen
remands suggest that takings liability relating to regulations like the Rhode
Island wetlands program and the South Carolina marsh island bridge
regulations were adopted.”); Gurganios v. City of Beaufort, 454 S.E.2d 912, 918 (S.C. App.
1995) (noting that “a property owner has a constitutionally protected right to continue the use
following enactment of a zoning ordinance” as a nonconforming use)
155
See Vulcan Materials Co. v. Greenville, 536 S.E. 2d 892, 901-902 (S.C. App. 2000)
(finding that Vulcan, by spending nearly $2 million and removing overburden in preparation
for building before the property was rezoned, established a vested right to the development
plan); see also Wyche, supra note 153.
156
See Faith R. Rivers, Preserving Heirs’ Property Along the Gullah Coast, 15
SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 147 (2006).
157
See Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and Promise of Bargaining in
Land Use Planning Conflicts, 7 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 337, 338 (2002).
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guidelines will be limited. Any such claims will fail under the Penn Central
regulatory takings balancing test – if not under the “character” or “impact”
inquiries, then at least for lack of “reasonable expectations,” crafted in light
of the background principle of the public trust doctrine.
But the significance of these decisions extends far beyond the state lines
of Rhode Island and South Carolina. The public trust doctrine has been
received at common law in nearly all of the States, and many have elevated
its principles to their constitutions in recognition of the importance of
preserving the critical public commons protected by the trust.158 Whenever
these states regulate land uses to protect public trust values associated with
the wetlands, tidelands, lakes, and rivers that are the subject of the doctrine,
they are regulating uses long withdrawn from the realm of purely private
interest by the very “background principles” of state law that govern the
takings inquiry. Claims for compensable takings under environmental
regulations designed to protect tidelands and wetlands – like the lawsuits
brought by David Lucas and Anthony Palazzolo – will likely wane in
number as they become harder to win, delighting environmental advocates
at the chagrin of property rights advocates. The implications of recognizing
the public trust doctrine in these terms are just beginning to be felt in Rhode
Island and South Carolina, but they will surely reverberate across the nation
in the ongoing legal contemplation of the enduring tension between public
and private interests in submerged lands.

158

See, e.g., CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., BULL. NO. 160-98, CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN
UPDATE app. at 2A-2 (1998), available at http://rubicon.water.ca.gov/pdfs/v1/v1ap2a.pdf
(last visited Feb. 4, 2007). “In a majority of states, the public trust doctrine requires the state
to hold navigable waters, the submerged lands underneath, and adjacent lands below the
ordinary high water mark in trust for the public.” Stephanie Showalter, No Right to Walk
between High Water Mark and Water’s Edge, The National Sea Grant Law Center (Oct. 31,
2006), http://www.olemiss.edu/orgs/SGLC/National/SandBar/3.2beach.htm (last visited Feb.
4, 2007). Most western states have now codified the doctrine. See Michael Blumm & Thea
Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 4 ISSUES IN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP, 12, 37 (2003), available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss4/ (last visited Feb.
4, 2007) (“The public trust in water now extends to at least a half dozen Western states California, North Dakota, Idaho, Washington, Montana, and Alaska - and probably to Oregon
as well. New Mexico and Wyoming have longstanding public access rights to both navigable
and nonnavigable waters which could ripen into recognition of the public trust in water.”).
Most state constitutions also declare that water and other resources are held in trust for the
public. Id. at 13, n. 97. For a list of state constitution sections that mention the public trust
doctrine, see Matthew Thor Kirsch, Upholding the Public Trust in State Constitutions, 46
DUKE L. J. 1169, 1176 n.19 (1997).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=951840

